- G. Schwartz, "An
insider’s account of the evacuation of Babylon. In his first interview
since returning to Europe, Dr René Teijgeler, former senior
advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, speaks about his experiences
in Baghdad," in The Art Newspaper
(UK), [May 6, 2005]: "... a Dutch conservator specialising in the
preservation and management of non-Western artefacts and documents,
served as senior advisor of the United States Embassy to the Iraqi
Ministry of Culture from July 2004 to March 2005. With the withdrawal
from Iraq of the Dutch on 10 March, Teijgeler left Iraq. His tasks have
now been taken over by Robert Kerr, cultural affairs officer of the US
embassy." "I studied sociology, anthropology, bookbinding and
conservation. Since 1996 I have run a bureau called Paper in
Development, for the preservation and management mainly of collections
of non-Western artefacts and documents." "... the cultural affairs unit
of CIMIC <CIMIC stands for Civil Military Co-operation, a NATO
programme for sending militarised civilian experts into the field to
perform tasks for which the military is unequipped. ... was shipped out
to Baghdad by the Dutch army as a major in the reserves. Two weeks
after I arrived my predecessor <Zainab Bahrani> left and I was
promoted in quick stages to Senior Advisor." "Most of the Senior
Advisors had extra staff, but all I had was a translator. The most
important instrument at my disposal was the high status of the position
of Senior Advisor. In military terms, this was equivalent to the rank
of a general; it gave me access to people in command. ... The first
advisors for the Ministry of Culture were the Italian diplomats Pietro
Cordone followed by Mario Bondioli Osio. They were succeeded by John
Malcolm Russell and Zainab Bahrani. The quick succession of advisors
was confusing for the Iraqis. When I assumed office, I was the fourth
cultural advisor within a period of four months. ... Why is it that your predecessors received
lots of publicity and you did not? I chose to avoid the press
and the media. I did this mostly for my personal safety but also
because keeping a low profile made it easier for me to negotiate." "The
National Library and Archive had been gutted by fire and 70% of the
collections were lost. But 42,000 documents, including rich archives
from the Ottoman era, had survived in the basement of the Ministry of
the Interior, where they were damaged by water. I got a $100,000 grant
from the US army for freezer trucks to stabilise them. A team of three
Iraqi restorers are going to take a course in paper conservation at the
Library of Congress and come back to restore the archive. Before I
arrived an Italian NGO had set up an electronic cataloguing project. We
worked very well together until the two staff members, the two Simonas
[Torretta and Pari], were kidnapped in October 2004. Soon after I went
to Europe with the director of the library for three weeks to raise
money. Basic repairs got under way at the beginning of 2005, but there
is still not enough money for proper reconstruction. I gave high
priority to training and improving management. To take full advantage
of the training opportunities that were offered to us, I introduced the
rule that everyone who went abroad had to speak English. In December
2004 more than 10 restorers-in-training went to the Czech Republic for
a two-month course on conservation."
"Then, in September 2003 the Multinational Division South Central
(MND-CS), under Polish command, established its regional base [at
Babylon]. What happened next is incomprehensible. Halliburton-KBR, ...
got permission—from whom, no one is saying—to set up a regional
logistic centre in Babylon. They levelled large tracts with
earth-moving equipment to create flat storage areas for heavy items
like trailers, containers and chemical toilets. When the dust cleared,
there were 2,500 troops stationed at Babylon. The Polish militarised
archaeologists managed to prevent some destruction, but a lot of damage
was done. ... How did you get Camp
Babylon evacuated? I worked out a plan from which everyone would
benefit. The Iraqis were going to get the site back under their
control; they received $200,000 and lots of equipment; 350 jobs were
created for paid guards, who received uniforms, arms and other
equipment. The benefit for the Americans was considerable. It might not
seem that way, but they worry a lot about international law. Even
though the US is not a signatory to The Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Heritage in the Event of Armed Conflict, the
Army claims to behave in the spirit of the convention. Halliburton-KBR
was easy to please. They made money out of demolishing the old camp and
building the new one. The move cost about $300 million. The Poles were
another story. In the beginning they were dead set against the move. It
took a direct command from Warsaw to get them to clear out. Even with
basic agreement between all parties, things were not happening quickly
enough. I encouraged the Minister of Culture to write a letter to the
then US ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, requesting a speedier
evacuation. With the help of General Charles Davidson, head of Civil
Military Affairs, who was genuinely concerned about Iraqi culture and
history, I reached George Casey, US Commanding General of the
Multi-National Force in Iraq. General Davidson and I drafted a response
to the Minister of Culture assuring him that all coalition troops would
be out of Babylon by January 2005. Once the Americans gave their word,
they followed through. The logistical problems were vast. 882 trucks
rode on and off day and night for months, moving everything to Diwanya,
about 100 kilometres away. To dissolve oil spills, we brought in
oil-eating bacteria. Everyone involved had to be made aware of the
danger of causing new damage. It happened. Babylon is now empty and
under Iraqi control. Conferring about the evacuation on site one day, I
found myself staring at the huge concrete security blocks that the
coalition forces put at the end of the famous Paradise Road. The heavy
trucks that put them there destroyed many of the 2,500 year-old baked
tiles paving the road. I asked the Iraqis how they were going to remove
these eyesores; they did not know. Taking advantage of the moment, I
got the Poles to lift the blocks out with Chinook helicopters."
"All development work is addictive, but Iraq was something else. On the
one hand I felt like a potentate, with powers that I never had before.
And on the other hand... My colleague Jim Mollen, Senior Advisor to the
Ministry of Education, with whom I shared an office in Baghdad, was
killed last November four days before he was going to go home. The day
she was kidnapped, I was scheduled to meet with Simona Torretta. A
convoy to al-Hatra that I almost joined was attacked by terrorists. I
left with the feeling that I had done good work. ... I arranged for an
archaeologist to be attached to the Project Contract Office, so all
building plans could be monitored. I assisted Iraq in re-enlisting the
major international cultural organisations. The US has asked me to
return to Baghdad in September as a civilian advisor to set up and
support national programmes for archives and libraries." "With my
experience in this line of work and with my new military contacts, I am
planning to found an NGO for cultural development work in countries in
conflict, filling the gap between military presence and the arrival of
civilian specialists. I am working on this with the CIMIC officer who
recruited me, Joris Kila. You were
known to oppose the war in Iraq. Did your conscience bother you working
for the Americans in Iraq? I was not in favour of the American
invasion of Iraq. But when I got there, I decided that recriminations
would do no one any good. I accepted reality as I encountered it and
set out to effect whatever improvements I could. To get anything done
in a war zone you have to cooperate with the military, whether you like
it or not. ... Without the coalition forces I could have done nothing
for Iraq’s cultural heritage. Moreover, I soon realised that whatever
damage the coalition troops have done, the effects of Saddam’s rule
were far worse. ... I avoided the question of blame altogether and
concentrated on what to do next. This was also the spirit in which I
dealt with the Iraqis and the Poles, who were not talking to each other
when I arrived. I agreed with them in advance that we were not going to
assign blame, only to seek common solutions to common problems. It
worked for me, and I made it work for them."
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